Defendant, who was a jewelry merchant, brought a proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus.

Defendant, who was a jewelry merchant, brought a proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release from custody on a charge of violating the provisions of a municipal ordinance regulating auction sales of jewelry for which defendant was arrested for his failure to obtain a license to auction his jewelry.

Defendant claimed that the ordinance violated the inalienable rights clause of Cal. Const. art. I, § 1; that as a general law it violated of Cal. Const. art. I, § 11 and Cal. Const. art. IV, § 25(33); and that it denied him equal protection of the law under U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The court determined that the city had the authority pursuant to its police powers to pass an ordinance that regulated certain businesses in which its citizens had been defrauded and the sale of jewelry at an auction was such a business. The court held that the ordinance did not violate Cal. Const. art. I, § 11 and Cal. Const. art. IV, § 25(33) as a general law when the ordinance specifically applied to the general business of conducting jewelry auctions, which could be regulated by the city. california class action attorneys The court also held that the classification of the jewelry auction business was reasonable based upon the desire of the city to protect its citizens from the fraud that had been committed upon them by jewelry auctions. The court also determined that defendant had been involved with his jewelry auction business without a license and that he was required to obtain one by the ordinance.

The court denied defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Appellant, the holder of a permit for a nude entertainment establishment, filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus, alleging that respondents, the city and chief of police, violated his First Amendment rights when his permit was suspended as a sanction for violating no-touch and six-foot regulations. The Superior Court of San Diego County, California, denied the petition, and the permit holder appealed.

The permit holder argued that suspending his permit was an unconstitutional prior restraint. The court disagreed, noting that the permit holder did not dispute that he violated valid regulations and did not challenge the ordinance as vague or lacking necessary procedural safeguards. His challenge was not to a prior restraint but to a punishment. The regulation, which allowed the suspension of a permit for code violations, was also not an invalid time, place, or manner restriction. Because it was content neutral, the court applied the four-part O’Brien test, and found that the government interest in obtaining compliance with regulations was unrelated to the suppression of speech. The regulation was sufficiently narrow, even though the expressive conduct, nude dancing, could not occur during the suspension because the suspension furthered the goal of obtaining compliance and was of limited duration. There was also no due process violation, even though there was delay in reporting some individual violations to the permit holder, because the suspension was based on persistent violations over an extended period, for which the permit holder had ample notice.

The judgment was affirmed.

Under a non-owned auto provision, an insured’s personal automobile insurance did not cover injuries to another driver in a collision caused when the insured was driving her employer’s van because the van was furnished for the insured’s regular use; it was assigned to her exclusively, she was authorized to use it for both business and personal purposes, and her use of the van for a personal errand at the time of the accident was not a departure from its customary use.

Judgment affirmed.